The part I find a bit odd in this, is that there's a "cart leading the horse" story in this. Fertility drops, as the economy rises above subsistence levels. So, the "which comes first" in this I feel tends to be, economic improvement comes first, then birth rates drop. Maybe I over-read "beneficial" to mean causative when it's just being noted as not un-helpful. But, thats very contextual.
There is then a middle passage where rising economic conditions make lower fertility usefully sustainable, with moderate inflationary immigration into the economy.
But then you hit Japan, and without significant re-appraisal of how economics work to national advantage, your need for replacement labour to manage the growing old population in decline is a huge burden on the tax base.
So this take, is interesting because it seems to invert some of the logic here. It seems to imply, because its economically advantageous, people observe it and stop having so many babies. I thought it was much more that high birthrate was driven in high childhood mortality, and economic necessity of subsistence farming.
I'm also a bit surprised this is worthy of note, because surely the persisting decline in Korean and Japanese birth rates measured over decades signalled this .. well decades ago? Isn't this trend now firmly established in most of the developed G20 class economies? Poland might be a catholic nation but like Ireland continues to be below replacement rate.
The French tax break was for ludicrously large families. like 5 or more. You'd be wrecked.
Not a demographer or a statistician or an economist, which will be obvious to all three reading the above.
> So, the "which comes first" in this I feel tends to be, economic improvement comes first, then birth rates drop.
When we examine this in the future, we will eventually learn it had multiple, diverse causes. And we'll probably be surprised, even tho every complex issue is like that.
One of those causes is our improved economy. I live with my 4 adult sons because we make typical wages; no two of can afford basic bills.
Tying this to birth rates, it has become unlikely (commonly impossible) for two typical wage earners to afford their own household. It's tough to raise a family without a home.
Traditional Persian (and probably other) middle class households are a Roman courtyard of connected rooms and shared facilities around a pool. There's a strong matrilinial hierarchy of who has the "best" rooms and I've read it's a grind for the junior family, but it's a combination of shared space and private space and in the context of a future where kids simply can't afford to buy, being able to move into a suite of rooms tacked onto the expanding family "domus" doesn't sound the worst choice.
The part I find a bit odd in this, is that there's a "cart leading the horse" story in this. Fertility drops, as the economy rises above subsistence levels. So, the "which comes first" in this I feel tends to be, economic improvement comes first, then birth rates drop. Maybe I over-read "beneficial" to mean causative when it's just being noted as not un-helpful. But, thats very contextual.
There is then a middle passage where rising economic conditions make lower fertility usefully sustainable, with moderate inflationary immigration into the economy.
But then you hit Japan, and without significant re-appraisal of how economics work to national advantage, your need for replacement labour to manage the growing old population in decline is a huge burden on the tax base.
So this take, is interesting because it seems to invert some of the logic here. It seems to imply, because its economically advantageous, people observe it and stop having so many babies. I thought it was much more that high birthrate was driven in high childhood mortality, and economic necessity of subsistence farming.
I'm also a bit surprised this is worthy of note, because surely the persisting decline in Korean and Japanese birth rates measured over decades signalled this .. well decades ago? Isn't this trend now firmly established in most of the developed G20 class economies? Poland might be a catholic nation but like Ireland continues to be below replacement rate.
The French tax break was for ludicrously large families. like 5 or more. You'd be wrecked.
Not a demographer or a statistician or an economist, which will be obvious to all three reading the above.
> So, the "which comes first" in this I feel tends to be, economic improvement comes first, then birth rates drop.
When we examine this in the future, we will eventually learn it had multiple, diverse causes. And we'll probably be surprised, even tho every complex issue is like that.
One of those causes is our improved economy. I live with my 4 adult sons because we make typical wages; no two of can afford basic bills.
Tying this to birth rates, it has become unlikely (commonly impossible) for two typical wage earners to afford their own household. It's tough to raise a family without a home.
Traditional Persian (and probably other) middle class households are a Roman courtyard of connected rooms and shared facilities around a pool. There's a strong matrilinial hierarchy of who has the "best" rooms and I've read it's a grind for the junior family, but it's a combination of shared space and private space and in the context of a future where kids simply can't afford to buy, being able to move into a suite of rooms tacked onto the expanding family "domus" doesn't sound the worst choice.
Sorry for the paywall, checked archived versions but no dice - more context here: https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/1118228