Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.
To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.
P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.
P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:
> We are making this release as fast as possible (we learned of the problem yesterday) because we have recently observed multiple cases of rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours, and so now consider long embargo periods to be a dangerous practice that primarily benefits attackers.
I think this will likely become standard. Nevertheless, a few stormy months are ahead.
How do you break back into your digital life? You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop. How would you get back into your digital life given only a laptop with access to the Internet, unless something, somewhere is passwordauthenticate=yes.
I walk to my pc and type ssh-keygen. If i can’t do that I’ve got bigger problems. “I must be able to recover remotely using a memorised credential” is a terrible requirement.
Yeah your vault has password authentication. Your password manager in other words. Your vault is where you store your private ssh keys, and or the passwords for the keys.
Remotely: An encrypted file with a seed / master passwords to all the other data, published under a public url you can remember, but not linked anywhere and not listed.
Locally: Same, but printed out, laminated, in a safe place with other documents.
Avoid this kind of behavior on HN; we are not the community for attacking each other. Your comment is not helpful to further the conversation. You could have made a point about subscriptions being antithetical to the ethos of open source culture, but instead you attacked the user and mocked him/her.
I agree entirely, but I'm not sure changing `crypt` to return `"*"` instead of `NULL` on failure qualifies. It's much more of a considered decision, which happens to be very wrong.
Seems slightly confusing that the OpenSSH release notes page says:
> This release contains a critical security workaround that affects Linux systems that use the musl libc and PAM disabled.
But that there's nothing about it on their security page.
Even if it's not technically a bug in their code, the fact that they've made a "critical" release to address it suggests that it should probably be listed on the security page as well. But maybe (hopefully) they just haven't updated the security page yet.
Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.
To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.
P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.
P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:
https://man.archlinux.org/man/crypt.3.en
You can’t call this function correctly. sshd’s “fix” is basically to assume that a too-short return is an error return instead of a success return.
PAM is also awful, but this is worse.
> We are making this release as fast as possible (we learned of the problem yesterday) because we have recently observed multiple cases of rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours, and so now consider long embargo periods to be a dangerous practice that primarily benefits attackers.
I think this will likely become standard. Nevertheless, a few stormy months are ahead.
musl only, the quick fix:
Which is a good advice in general.How do you break back into your digital life? You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop. How would you get back into your digital life given only a laptop with access to the Internet, unless something, somewhere is passwordauthenticate=yes.
> You wake up in a strange place. Something happened. Everything's gone. No wallet/keys/smartphone/tablet/laptop.
at this point the _last_ thing i care about is my email.
where am i? am i ok? how are my friends/loved ones?
once those are in place, it becomes clearer how to get back to "normal"
I walk to my pc and type ssh-keygen. If i can’t do that I’ve got bigger problems. “I must be able to recover remotely using a memorised credential” is a terrible requirement.
The somewhere for password authentication is a place you have physical access. Not ssh.
Does this happen to you a lot? You may have other issues
I log in via console, either physical or virtual (the latter requires MFA though)
Yeah your vault has password authentication. Your password manager in other words. Your vault is where you store your private ssh keys, and or the passwords for the keys.
Remotely: An encrypted file with a seed / master passwords to all the other data, published under a public url you can remember, but not linked anywhere and not listed.
Locally: Same, but printed out, laminated, in a safe place with other documents.
A scenario where all the backups are gone and the server is somehow the only thing that survived is not a very plausible one.
1Password subscription and the memorized key. 1Password is the only place my ssh private keys are stored.
1PaSsWoRd... SuBsCripTIon... it's just unbelievable how pathetic today's average HN user is...
Avoid this kind of behavior on HN; we are not the community for attacking each other. Your comment is not helpful to further the conversation. You could have made a point about subscriptions being antithetical to the ethos of open source culture, but instead you attacked the user and mocked him/her.
imo this is a good advice only if the devices that connect to the server have their home encrypted and ssh private key protected.
Who does PasswordAuthentication=yes in this day and age anyway.
If you run a cockpit service on your server you will need password authentication enabled, unfortunately.
it's the default for most systems. I can't remember a time I had to not turn it off.
People who use AuthenticationMethods "publickey,password"
You must present a key first after which you must enter a password.
Just do no password at all.
Putting the one in 1fa? No thanks.
As this is apparently affecting openwrt, probably a fair number of openwrt users, if I had to guess
This looks terrible for musl, what a collection of terrible decisions on their part. I guess I'm staying away from it.
To err is human. There’s no escaping it, I’m afraid.
I agree entirely, but I'm not sure changing `crypt` to return `"*"` instead of `NULL` on failure qualifies. It's much more of a considered decision, which happens to be very wrong.
>We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside OpenSSH itself, but we're in a good position to deliver a mitigation quickly.
So not a ssh issue but an issue specific to Linux using "musl libc without PAM".
I'm sure some people running lightweight containers just had a heart attack.
I would imagine the vast majority of lightweight containers don't contain an ssh server?
I presume Dropbear, thus musl-based OpenWrt routers are also not affected? Not that Dropbear has been an example in that regard.
There is this write-up/fancy page from the person who found the vulnerability[0] (HN discussion[1], how I found this thread).
At the bottom of that it says dropbear is unaffected.
> on debian, ubuntu, fedora or anything else with glibc? going through pam? dropbear? openbsd? you're fine
[0] https://sshhole.com/
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50378228
Since after you posted, various people in the thread have reported dropbear is not affected
Workaround? Why not a fix?
AFAIU because the bug is in musl and not in OpenSSH
Seems slightly confusing that the OpenSSH release notes page says:
> This release contains a critical security workaround that affects Linux systems that use the musl libc and PAM disabled.
But that there's nothing about it on their security page.
Even if it's not technically a bug in their code, the fact that they've made a "critical" release to address it suggests that it should probably be listed on the security page as well. But maybe (hopefully) they just haven't updated the security page yet.